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Abstract
This essay contends that postcolonial migrants have a right to enter their 
former colonizing nations, and that these should accept them. Our novel 
argument challenges well-established justifications for restrictions in 
immigration-policies advanced in liberal nationalism, which links immigration 
controls to the nation’s self-determination and the legitimate preservation of 
national identity. To do so, we draw on postcolonial analyses of colonialism, in 
particular on Edward Said’s notion of “intertwined histories,” and we offer a 
more sophisticated account of national identity than that of liberal nationalists. 
In our view, the national identity of former colonizing nations cannot be 
understood in isolation from their ex-colonies. This entails that liberal 
nationalists cannot justify the restriction on the entrance of members of the 
nation’s former colonies by resorting to an argument about the preservation 
of national identity: the former colonized constitute an inseparable element 
of that national identity, because they are already historically part of it.
Keywords
Liberal nationalism, colonialism, right to exclude, postcolonial immigration, 
intertwined histories
Postcolonial migration constitutes a significant trend in the direction of glo-
balised mass-migratory movements. The composition of immigration flows 
towards nation-states with a past of colonial expansion tends to reflect this 
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history. Consider former colonial powers such as the United Kingdom and 
France where Indian and Algerian nationals respectively represent the largest 
group of non-native resident population.1 This pattern seems confirmed even 
when one looks at immigration data of former colonizing nation-states that 
are, today, comparatively less well-off. In Portugal, for example, the largest 
section of non-native resident population is Brazilians.2
While preference for immigration-destinations expressed by trends in 
postcolonial migration has remained relatively constant in the aftermath of 
decolonization, receiving “metropoleis” have progressively adopted more 
restrictive immigration policies towards would-be immigrants from their for-
mer colonies. In some cases, the introduction of these restrictions (e.g., visa 
regulations) by former colonizers marked the gaining of independence of the 
colonies. For example, the Netherlands adopted a visa regime towards 
Surinamese only five years after Surinam became independent (1975).3 In 
other cases, it was the alignment with common and “neutral” EU immigra-
tion standards that determined a switch in immigration policies. This is evi-
dent by looking at the changes in the immigration laws of nation-states like 
Portugal and Spain. While traditionally more welcoming of migrants from 
their ex-colonies, whom they considered part of a transnational community 
rooted in historical and cultural ties (i.e., Lusophone Community and 
Comunidad Hispánica),4 they had to downsize postcolonial admissions as a 
result of “Europeanization.”5
This shows that most existing immigration regimes of nation-states that 
were colonial powers do not treat postcolonial migrants as a special category 
of entrance-applicants. In fact, postcolonial migrants at their borders experi-
ence, ceteris paribus, the same difficulties in getting visas as migrants from 
countries that were not part of the colonial system.
Whether or not postcolonial migrants should represent a special category 
of immigration-applicants raises the question of what kind of constraints 
there should be on the right to exclude that nation-states typically enjoy. A 
standard, though still contested,6 justification of this right is provided on the 
basis of national self-determination, from which it follows that the choices 
about whom to admit fall under the discretionary power held by each nation-
state. Discretion is not the same as absolute power to decide, so even political 
theorists that defend nation-states’ right to exclude accept that it is constrained 
by humanitarian concerns (e.g., refugees)7 and/or that nation-states should pro-
vide would-be immigrants with a legitimate justification for exclusion.8 This 
essay argues for an additional constraint on the exercise of the right to exclude. 
This constraint affects nation-states that were colonial powers by guaranteeing 
postcolonial migrants a right to enter their former “motherland” and by impos-
ing a correlative obligation of justice to admit them on the latter.
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Our aim is to challenge liberal nationalism, which has proven to be the 
most strenuous position in defending the nation-state’s right to exclude, as 
will become evident in the first section of the essay where we present the 
liberal nationalist view about immigration. Unlike theorists that criticize it 
for its incompatibility with liberal (egalitarian) and democratic values, we 
call the view into question on its very own terms. If liberal nationalists care 
about national identity, special relations, and history as they claim, they 
should be more attentive to the complexity of these notions.
Motivated by this critical observation, we move to the second section of 
the essay where we offer an interpretation of the historical experience of 
colonialism9 and we bring to the forefront aspects of the colonial relation that 
liberal nationalists often neglect or underestimate, namely, the cultural 
dimension. Building on this more complex reading of colonialism, we sug-
gest to re-visit the idea of national identity by incorporating Edward Said’s 
notion of intertwined histories. We thus claim that the colonies represent a 
fundamental element for the national identity of their colonizers. Our third 
section is devoted to explore the consequences that our refined notion of 
national identity carries for the liberal nationalist position on justice in immi-
gration. Here, we argue that liberal nationalists cannot support immigration 
restrictions towards members of the nation’s former colonies. Instead, they 
should accept that postcolonial migrants have a right to enter their former 
colonizing nation (because, historically, they are already in); conversely, the 
nation where they come from does not have a reciprocal obligation to admit 
migrants from the ex-colonizing nation. Thus, our proposal substantially dif-
fers from existing immigration policies that give special weight to historical 
and cultural ties. The fourth and last section of the essay concludes with a 
reflection on how our argument helps build a constructive exchange between 
analytical political theory and postcolonial theory.
Liberal Nationalism and Immigration
Liberal nationalists defend what can be described as a “relational” account of 
justice in immigration.10 As David Miller suggests, this entails that, in order 
to evaluate an immigration policy as just or unjust, the specific relation 
between an immigration-applicant and the nation-state she wants to enter 
must be considered.11 While liberal nationalists accept that individuals have 
a right to emigrate, they do not think that there is also a general right to immi-
grate into a specific nation-state. Therefore, granting immigration status can 
be more or less constrained depending on certain relational requirements. 
These can have different grounds and force: for example, an immigration-
applicant may have an economic interest in migrating to the United Kingdom 
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rather than Italy, because the United Kingdom would be a better destination 
to fulfil that interest given its stronger economy. But this satisfies a relational 
requirement only putatively, because the applicant’s claim does not tie her to 
the United Kingdom in particular, which therefore enjoys greater discretion 
over how many economic migrants to admit. A different case would be that 
of an immigration-applicant whose claim to enter is clearly directed at that 
nation-state on the grounds of a particular relation with it. Miller, for instance, 
considers the claim of those who have served the receiving nation-state in 
some capacity in the past (e.g., Nepalese Ghurkhas serving in UK military).12 
The strength of their claim is substantiated by an existing relation between 
them and the receiving nation-state; accordingly, the constraints on admis-
sions must be weighed against such a relation. Note that Miller is careful in 
positing immigration as the best way to compensate those who, having served 
the nation, stand in this kind of relation with it. For liberal nationalists, there 
is nevertheless an important qualitative difference between migrants’ claims 
based on relational considerations and those that are not.
The fundamental role that relations play in immigration derives from lib-
eral nationalists’ more general relational (or associative) understanding of 
justice. While relational theories display a basic moral concern for every 
human being, they also hold that considerations of social justice arise among 
those who are parties to particular relations. For liberal nationalists, the rele-
vant relation in which individuals stand is of a cooperative type, such as that 
existing between co-nationals.13 As Margaret Moore puts it, members of the 
same national community cooperate in the “common project of creating justice 
together.”14 This presupposes not only the “present fact of their cooperation,”15 
but also an idea of cooperation as intergenerational, because it is rooted in a 
common historical identity. Liberal nationalists indeed describe nations as 
historical and ethical communities. Let’s see what they mean by this charac-
terization. Defining nations as historical refers first of all to their continuity 
over time; national communities stretch into the future, but are also a product 
of the past—they are “legacies of remembrances.”16 The past is a fundamen-
tal element of their (national) identity, which renders the idea that, were it not 
for that past, the national identity would not be the same.17 It is that particular 
history which makes the nation what it is and which gives shape to its iden-
tity.18 For liberal nationalists, the connection with the particular past of the 
nation is expressed by the fact that co-nationals identify with their ancestors 
and their actions throughout history, by “re-appropriating their deeds as 
[their] own.”19 It is through this act of identification with the past that nations 
become ethical communities, that is, communities of obligations between 
different generations of co-nationals. By identifying with their own ances-
tors, co-nationals recognize that they also have obligations towards their 
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descendants.20 Liberal nationalists are indeed known for defending the idea 
that co-nationals inherit responsibility for their past actions and for the rela-
tions that nations established throughout their history.21
These historical and ethical elements of the national community come 
together in liberal nationalist defences of the nations’ right to self-determination. 
For liberal nationalists, this right is fundamental for the collective autonomy of 
nations and for preserving national identity. The exercise of national self- 
determination also entails controlling those who can enter the national borders; 
that is, the right to national self-determination grounds the nation’s right to 
exclude.22 Being so justified however does not imply that the right to exclude 
is also unconstrained, in the sense that the nation does not have absolute dis-
cretion about the terms of entrance. Liberal nationalists grant that any immi-
gration regime will need to respect some liberal provisos if it wants to be just, 
such as avoiding racial discrimination. Obviously, different liberal nationalist 
accounts will specify the constraints on nations’ discretionary power over 
immigration controls in different ways, for example by requiring that a liberal 
immigration regime be not entirely designed on the basis of historical and 
cultural preferences for particular migrants, or, alternatively, that it provide 
rejected immigrants with “neutral” reasons, e.g. economic ones. The impor-
tant point is this: above these constraints, liberal nationalists will regard the 
exercise of the right to exclude as remaining within the discretionary power 
of the nation, which will base its decisions over admission on an evaluation 
of its relation to would-be immigrants.
When it comes to migrants from the nation’s former colonies, what degree 
of discretion does the nation have in exercising its right to exclude? In light 
of liberal nationalists’ relational account of justice, an answer to this question 
requires looking at whether (1) there exists a relation between postcolonial 
migrants and the receiving nation-state and (2) how strong this relation is. 
The next two sections are devoted to explore these aspects respectively by 
explaining what kind of relation colonialism was and whether any relational 
constraint on immigration derives from it.
What Makes Colonialism a Special Relation?
The Cultural Dimension of Colonialism
There is little doubt that colonialism established a system of relations between 
the colonizers and the colonized. It is also undisputed that the colonized were 
not on an equal footing with their colonizers. While political theorists explain 
the type of injustice of the colonial relation mainly in terms of economic exploi-
tation and political subjection,23 postcolonial scholars point out that these 
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understandings of colonialism are necessary, though incomplete. The exclusive 
focus on the economic and political aspects does not recognize that colonial 
injustice had a cultural dimension, which must be a part of its normative 
evaluation.24 The postcolonial literature makes clear that the cultural aspects of 
colonialism are not only a component of that injustice but are fundamental to 
explaining the resilience of the colonial system over the centuries. The “cul-
tural politics of colonialism”25 sustained the colonial relation because, through 
the idea of cultural superiority, it provided an important justification of the 
colonial enterprise in the metropolis. However, if colonialism could be main-
tained over time in the colonies, it was also by means of cultural domination.
Cultural domination took place in different ways, depending on context 
and on the phases of colonialism. The “scramble for Africa,” for example, 
was characterized by a “civilizing” project entailing the destruction of the 
native culture in order to replace it with the colonizers’ superior values and 
the cancellation of the local history to “write the history of [the colonizers’] 
own nation.”26 Albert Memmi powerfully describes this process from the per-
spective of the colonized:
the traces of the past are slowly erased, and the future remnants will no longer 
carry the stamp of the colonised group. The few statues which decorate [the] 
city represent . . . the great deeds of colonization. The buildings are patterned 
after the colonizer’s favorite designs; the same is true for the street names, 
which recall the faraway provinces from which he [sic] came.27
This form of cultural domination thus resulted in what Aimé Césaire defines 
“thingification,” which is the progressive de-humanization of the colonized.28 
The Indian experience of cultural domination, instead, has been described 
predominantly as one of “hybridization,”29 where elements of the native cul-
ture were either maintained in new cultural schemas or significantly re- 
conceptualized. Obviously, by distinguishing two different forms of cultural 
domination, we are not suggesting that the colonial encounter was just of one 
form or the other. In India, for instance, these two forms characterized differ-
ent phases of colonial rule.
Similarly, we do not want to suggest that hybridization was a less norma-
tively problematic form of cultural domination than more direct forms of 
colonialism. The deep cultural effects of hybridization can be found in his-
torical works such as that of Partha Chatterjee, which provides an authorita-
tive explanation of how Indians (especially élites) tended to shape the “sphere 
of the material” (e.g., statecraft, economy, science) by taking the British one 
as a model, and held on to the native culture in the realm of the “spiritual” 
(e.g., family, art, religion).30
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When hybridization concerned the re-conceptualization of native cultural 
elements, it usually involved their relocation within the framework provided 
by the values of the colonizers. Gender has been taken as an example of this 
in that androgynous and bisexual practices, which were predominant in India 
before British colonialism, progressively lost their significance and more 
patriarchal relations became central.31 A similar development interested the 
category of “caste”. While it originally represented just one of the ways in 
which Indian communities managed social stratification, under colonialism, 
it was turned into a comprehensive system of hierarchical organization for 
the entire Indian society.32
These examples clearly explain the significance of the cultural impact of 
colonial rule on the colonized. However, postcolonial scholars insist on 
pointing out that the colonial relation culturally affected the colonizers, too, 
and affirm that “the colonial situation manufacture[d] colonialists, just as it 
manufacture[d] the colonized.”33 Although the “colonial experience” in the 
metropolis is not usually analysed in political theory, it becomes crucial for 
understanding colonialism as a complex relation; it is only by acknowledging 
that this experience pertained to both the colonizing and colonized nations 
that one can fully appreciate the relational character of colonialism. A focus 
on the cultural dimension of colonialism clarifies this because it shows how 
the colonies served as a constant source of imagination and influence for the 
development of the national culture of the colonizers.34 This impact was so 
pervasive that the only way to understand many “cultural markers”35 forming 
the basis of the colonizers’ national identity is by taking the colonized into 
consideration.
This point can be illustrated by the importance that novels usually play in 
the making and maintaining of national identity; their function is understood 
precisely as to encourage the development of the nation by allowing co-
nationals to “imagine [the nation as] the special community.”36 That is, by 
reducing differences and fostering unity, novels narrate the nation.37 Think of 
how the novels by Joseph Conrad and Rudyard Kipling played a fundamental 
role in narrating nineteenth-century Britain. These works would not exist 
without the colonies in which their adventures and romances are set. In fact, 
it is through these novels that the colonies entered and helped constructing 
the national (imperial) identity.38 But the presence of the colonies is tangible 
also in Victorian novels set in Britain, such as those by Jane Austen and 
Charlotte Brönte. In their works, British colonial possessions become part of 
the daily life in the “motherland.” Stories like that of how Sir Thomas 
Bertram’s estate in Mansfield Park is maintained thanks to his possessions in 
Antigua, or that of St. John Rivers’ departure to India in Jane Eyre bring the 
colonies closer to the metropolis by including these “distant” lands into the 
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day-to-day discourses and experiences of British nationals. In other words, 
they show how the colonial empire was at the centre of British national iden-
tity and history.
The Notion of “Intertwined Histories”
Paying attention to the cultural dimension of colonialism not only sheds light 
on the interdependence between the colonizers and the colonized, it also 
reveals how the experience of the former heavily depended on the latter. 
While this helps us to make sense of the complexity that characterized the 
colonial relation, it is not sufficient to explain its enduring force. To do so, we 
draw and elaborate on Said’s notion of “intertwined histories,” according to 
which the history of the colonized and that of the colonizers are “intertwined” 
in that they are inseparable: “one could not be written without taking the 
other into account.”39 When two nations have intertwined histories, it means 
not only that they are in a special relation but that their identities are mutually 
constituted over time. Said expresses this quite clearly, when he asks:
Who in India or Algeria today can confidently separate out the British or 
French component of the past from the present actualities, and who in Britain 
or France can draw a clear circle around British London or French Paris that 
would exclude the impact of India and Algeria upon those two imperial cities?40
In this interpretation, the colonial experience created so strong a relation that 
the transformations and fusions it initiated in national identities continue 
even in its aftermath. This holds as a general conceptual claim, which does 
not deny the possible existence of exceptional colonial experiences for which 
the presence of intertwined histories seems harder to prove (e.g. Italy’s colo-
nial experience in Ethiopia).
A critic may object that, to render this idea, we do not need the introduction 
of the novel concept of intertwined histories: Why not use, instead, the notion 
of “shared history” and stick to the way in which liberal nationalists often 
deploy it to justify the existence of special duties between co-nationals?
This is a legitimate complaint, but we want to argue that the concept of 
intertwined histories makes a substantive contribution to the understanding 
of colonial relations, and therefore cannot be reduced to a mere terminologi-
cal shift. To this end, let us consider the notion of shared history as defined in 
the work of Thomas Hurka and discuss its limits for our purposes. Hurka 
identifies two conditions that need to be satisfied for history to be shared. It 
must be a history of (1) “mutual benefit,” in which participants have “shared” 
the goods of their cooperation in a reciprocal way, and (2) “shared suffering,” 
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meaning that the parties had to face common adversities or experienced the 
same tragedy.41
This notion of shared history is too broad and too narrow at the same time. 
On the one hand, it is over-inclusive to the point that it becomes meaningless 
for singling out colonial relations as complex and particularly strong ones. On 
the basis of Hurka’s definition, for example, Italy and Germany can be said to 
have a shared history. As allies in World War II, they would fit (1), because 
they collaborated in the military and economic efforts of wartime, and did so 
to their mutual benefit. They would also meet (2), since they shared the suffer-
ing of the war. The problem with this understanding is that there are many 
instances of shared history between nations like the one just considered. The 
dynamics characterizing colonialism, however, describe a rather extra- 
ordinary historical relation. The colonial encounter, as discussed above, had a 
pervasive impact on both the colonizers and the colonized, which makes the 
notion of shared history too weak to capture such a strong relation.
On the other hand, the concept of shared history appears under-inclusive in 
one fundamental respect; insofar as it stresses an idea of reciprocity, it assumes 
that only historical relations conducted on roughly equal terms matter. 
Following this definition, the history between, say, Germany and its former 
colony Namibia would not count as shared proper, thereby being excluded 
from considerations that pertain to obligations grounded in special relations. 
But this is an odd conclusion, because it implies that only relations that already 
qualify as cooperatively fair and equal raise concerns for justice.42 From the 
perspective of liberal nationalists, this should be even more troubling given 
that nations are required to take responsibility for the unjust relations they 
established over their history—as we mentioned in the first section.
The definition of colonialism as intertwined histories—rather than 
“shared” history—allows to better capture the main features of the colonial 
relation. It is only when, as in the case of colonialism, the relation between 
nations is so pervasive and enduring to make their national identities mutu-
ally constitutive, that their histories become intertwined. It is worth pointing 
out that, by describing colonialism as creating intertwined histories between 
the colonizers and the colonized, we do not want to underplay the importance 
of the process of decolonization. In particular, we recognize that, for the colo-
nized, the achievement of independence required the re-discovery of a 
“national” history and identity prior to the “trauma” of colonialism, which 
colonial domination tried to destroy or transform. Rather than underplaying 
the role of decolonization for the national identity of the colonized, the 
introduction of intertwined histories emphasises the too-often neglected 
influence that the colonies exercised on the national identity of their former 
“motherland.”
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Another advantage of employing this notion is that it does not ignore the 
inegalitarian structure of the colonial relation. Unlike the adjective “shared,” 
which suggests an equal positioning between nations, the term “intertwined” 
refers to “massively knotted and complex”43 relations, hence not necessarily 
to equal ones.
In this sense, it may be possible to extend the notion of intertwined histo-
ries to relations between nations that were not colonial. Indeed, one could 
point at historical relations different from colonialism, which would never-
theless fit the notion of intertwined histories as to their deep effects on the 
identities of the nations involved. While we are open to this possibility, we 
cannot explore it in this essay. Our focus lies with the colonial context from 
where the notion of intertwined histories was originally developed; its appli-
cation to other cases would require a thorough and ad hoc interpretation of 
their main relational features. For now, let us note that even if the notion of 
intertwined histories were proven to explain relations other than colonialism, 
it would nevertheless maintain its distinctiveness from the concept of 
“shared” history. Only those relations between nations that had a pervasive 
and mutual effect such that their identities have been mutually constituted 
would count as intertwined.
Through the notion of intertwined histories, we are able to offer a more 
sophisticated account of national identity than the one usually at play in lib-
eral nationalism. While on both accounts the nation describes a community 
of individuals bounded up together by history and who contribute to the defi-
nition of its identity, liberal nationalists do not consider the former colonized 
as participating in the process through which their former colonizers devel-
oped their national identity. Our account, on the contrary, recognizes that the 
former colonized represent a category of persons who are not, strictly speak-
ing, co-nationals but who are part of the national community. This is because, 
through history, they are implicated in the process of constructing the national 
identity of the colonizers. Paraphrasing Homi Bhabha, the nation becomes a 
liminal signifying space that is internally marked by colonial difference.44
To summarize the main points of the first two sections, we have argued 
that for liberal nationalists, nations are historical and ethical communities, 
meaning that they are communities of obligations that stretch over time and, 
in particular, take responsibility for the relations they established over their 
histories. We have also explained how, by virtue of its cultural dimension, 
colonialism counts as a relation of a special kind—one that created inter-
twined histories between colonizing and colonized nations. At this point, it is 
possible to raise the question as to what kinds of duties of justice nations, qua 
communities of obligations, have with respect to such intertwined histories. 
In particular, once the colonized have been described as already contributing 
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to the national identity of the colonizers, what should happen at the borders 
of the nation?
The Right to Enter of Postcolonial Migrants
The Right and Its Specifications
In this section, we return to the question of postcolonial nationals’ claim to 
immigrate into their former colonizing nation-state and we examine, in par-
ticular, whether the latter can legitimately justify non-admission. Recall from 
the first section that liberal nationalists endorse a relational account of jus-
tice, in which the quality of relations determines the rights and duties of those 
who are participants in them. Colonialism has been described as one such 
relation, in that it established strong (cultural and identity) bonds between the 
colonizing and the colonized nations that make their relation endure today.
Putting these together, we are now able to see that the colonial relation 
grounds different types of duties former colonizing nations should fulfil. To 
begin with, there are duties to redress the historical injustice of colonialism 
they committed.45 In a liberal nationalist perspective, these are among the 
most stringent duties nations have; Miller exemplifies this when he claims, as 
we have already mentioned, that nations inherit responsibility to set the his-
torical record straight.46
As important as duties of redress may be, there are also other kinds of 
duties on the part of former colonizers, which are based on the special char-
acter of the colonial relation. Duties of distributive justice may fall into this 
additional category of obligations, especially when it is acknowledged that 
colonialism established a coercive and cooperative system between the colo-
nizers and the colonized. As argued by Lea Ypi, Robert Goodin, and Christian 
Barry, former colonizers have a duty to share the benefits of the outcomes of 
the cooperation that was part of colonial rule, besides obligations to rectify 
their un-fulfilled duties of distributive justice during colonialism. Liberal 
nationalists may be sensitive to this kind of argument, given their relational 
account of justice.
However, we argue that unlike Ypi et al., liberal nationalists are also 
equipped to expand the category of the duties of former colonizers beyond 
obligations of distributive justice. This is because their notion of nations qua 
historical and ethical communities points towards an understanding of colo-
nialism that goes beyond its economic and political dimensions, bringing its 
cultural dynamics to the forefront—as we have done in the previous section.
For liberal nationalists, considerations of justice that do not necessarily count 
as distributive, but remain relational, are those pertaining to immigration. Recall 
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that liberal nationalists endorse a relational conception of justice in immigra-
tion: in order to assess the strength of an immigration-applicant’s claim and 
whether the nation is obliged to accept it, they need to look at the relation in 
which the applicant and that particular nation stand. Hence, while the nation 
enjoys discretion over the terms of entrance by virtue of the right to self-
determination, its decisions over whom to admit must also do justice to the 
quality of the relations with would-be immigrants.
In the context of migrants from the nation’s former colonies, this relation 
is particularly strong and special because of the pervasive cultural impact of 
colonialism on national identity of the nation receiving its postcolonial 
migrants and their nation of origin. We have described this through the notion 
of intertwined histories. A major implication of colonialism so defined is that 
postcolonial migrants are already part of the “self” that determines the ex-
colonizing nation, because they are essential contributors to its identity. This 
makes it the case that former colonizers cannot justify the exclusion of immi-
grants they can regard as historically within the nation. Therefore, the exer-
cise of the right to exclude is further constrained for nations that once were 
colonial powers. The obligation to let postcolonial migrants in is an addition 
to the constraints that liberal nationalists already accept, such as those stem-
ming from humanitarian concerns and those grounded on liberal values. 
Furthermore, it is precisely on the basis of this obligation that an argument 
can be put forward in order to justify the right of postcolonial migrants to 
immigrate into a particular nation-state. This is an extremely significant con-
clusion to be drawn from a liberal nationalist perspective; in fact, while lib-
eral nationalists tend to recognize a general right to emigrate, they do not 
think that there is a corresponding right to immigrate to a specific nation-state 
(see first section). Our argument, on the contrary, shows that for postcolonial 
migrants this right exists.48
Let us now specify its characteristics. First, by stressing the notion of hav-
ing a right we want to distance our proposal from immigration policies that 
grant access to specific groups of migrants in light of cultural and social 
preferences. Until recently, preferential treatment towards particular types of 
migrants has been a common feature of immigration policies; for example, 
post-war France favoured immigrants from European nation-states such as 
Italy, Germany, Spain, and Portugal, on the basis of their presumed cultural 
and historical commonalities, and thus on their alleged “assimilability.”49 
This logic grounding preferential admissions would seem to be well-suited to 
the context of postcolonial immigration. One may argue that Britain could 
prefer the entrance of migrants from India because the cultural connection 
and the mastery of the English language generally make the integration of 
Indians into British society easier than that of, say, Chinese migrants. This 
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rationale however is very different from ours, in spite of the common stress 
on the cultural dimension of colonialism. For us the cultural aspect is crucial 
to explain the notion of intertwined histories, which however does not serve 
to posit cultural assimilability as a legitimate criterion for admission. Rather, 
the notion elaborates the idea of national identity and shows how postcolonial 
migrants cannot be excluded because they are already part of the nation.
The proof of this is that even postcolonial migrants who are perceived as 
difficult to assimilate, and whom consequently a nation would prefer not to 
admit, should be accepted because of the obligation that stems from the spe-
cial and enduring relation that colonialism established between them and the 
nation-state of entrance. Algerian migrants to France have traditionally been 
regarded as hostile to French national values, and, on this ground, severe 
immigration restrictions have regulated their admission.50 While France may 
have a preference not to admit Algerian migrants, such a preference is overrid-
den by its obligation towards the intertwined histories created by her colonial 
dominion in Algeria; according to our account, Algerians cannot be rejected at 
the borders of France, because colonialism places them already inside.
The second characteristic of postcolonial migrants’ right to enter the 
nation-state of their former colonizers worth clarifying is whether such a 
right entails an equal right for the latter. In other words: Do the ex-colonized 
have a reciprocal obligation of justice to admit migrants from the nation-state 
of their ex-colonizers? As a general rule, a right grounded on intertwined 
histories should be reciprocal.51 This is due to the fact that participants to the 
intertwined histories mutually constitute each other’s identity.
However, it is important to emphasise that our account of intertwined his-
tories not only looks at the degree to which one nation contributed to the 
development of another nation’s identity. It is also sensitive to the way in 
which this development took place, highlighting the quality, that is, the struc-
ture, of the relation between the two contributing nations. As we have already 
mentioned, this means that we must acknowledge the fact that those involved 
in intertwined histories may not have partaken in them on an equal footing. 
The point of characterizing histories as intertwined (as opposed to shared) is 
to express their complexity. In the case of colonialism, this speaks to the need 
of recognizing the histories of colonizing and colonized nations as interdepen-
dent, and yet, their colonial relation as profoundly unequal. As Said reminds 
us, “the problem, then, is to keep in mind two ideas that are in many ways 
antithetical—the fact of the imperial divide, on the one hand, and the notion of 
shared experiences, on the other—without diminishing the force of either.”52
Sensitivity to the unequal structure of the colonial relation is respected by 
arguing that it does not generate identical obligations of justice on its partici-
pants. In this sense, it would be unjust to require that former colonies admit 
 at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on November 23, 2015ptx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
14 Political Theory 
would-be immigrants from former colonial powers on the basis of a special 
relation which they were forced into. Rather, our argument can only suggest 
that the former colonized may express a legitimate preference towards admit-
ting or not their former colonizers. So, it follows that a former colony does not 
have an obligation to admit immigrants from the former colonizing nation 
because of the inequality of the colonial relation, its impact and legacy (e.g., the 
need to re-establish a connection with the past that colonialism destroyed). But 
a former colony could exercise a preference towards the admission of its ex-
colonizers, in which case the usual constraints on the right to exclude apply.
Insisting on the non-reciprocal character of postcolonial migrants’ right to 
enter distinguishes it from immigration policies between colonizing and col-
onized nations that were enacted in the aftermath of colonisation. The poli-
cies we are referring to gave weight to the special bonds that colonialism 
created, but demanded that whatever special treatment was granted on the 
basis of their relations be reciprocated. This is the case of relaxed immigra-
tion policies between Portugal and its ex-colony Brazil. Similarly to our pro-
posal, this policy recognizes Portugal’s obligation to admit Brazilians by 
virtue of the colonial relation; however, unlike ours, it makes such an obliga-
tion conditional on Brazil’s duty to reciprocate by letting the Portuguese in.53
Two Possible Objections
Having defended postcolonial migrants’ right to enter, we consider and 
respond to two possible objections that could be raised against our argument. 
The first has to do with our preference for the nation as our unit of analysis 
over both (1) the state and (2) European civilization; the second with the pos-
sible discriminating effects of our immigration proposal. Let us address these 
objections in order.
A critic could raise doubts about our insistence on taking nations as the 
unit of analysis in issues regarding immigration, while it is in fact states that 
are usually in charge of making such decisions. This critical remark refers to 
a more general and longstanding objection that many directed at the liberal 
nationalist position, that is, its problematic distinction between the nation and 
the state.54
The first point to note therefore is that the concerns that our critic raises 
apply to the liberal nationalist framework in which our argument is cast, 
rather than to its content. Insofar as this objection challenges the very assump-
tions of liberal nationalism, we address it by relying on standard liberal 
nationalist answers. One of these arguments is that a focus on the nation 
rather than the state allows recognizing responsibilities over time; for liberal 
nationalists, the advantage of taking nations as agents of justice is that their 
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continuity over time is more easily established than that of states. For 
instance, Miller notices—in an Aristotelian vein—that it is difficult to prove 
the continuity of the state apparatus after substantial (e.g., constitutional) 
changes have occurred, and to illustrate he considers Nazi Germany and the 
democratic state that replaced it.55 The importance of capturing the historical 
continuity of agents of justice is relevant for a relational conception of justice 
(including justice in immigration), because it allows taking into consider-
ation relations established in the past.
This answer may not fully persuade the critic, who should nevertheless be 
reminded that our aim is neither to defend the assumptions of liberal national-
ism nor to suggest that it represents the best conception of justice in immigra-
tion. More modestly, our argument says that we can defend the right 
postcolonial migrants have to enter their former colonizers from a position 
that is allegedly one of the most hostile in positing a right to be included in a 
particular nation-state.
At this point, our critic could still press us on our choice of the nation and 
argue that our relevant unit of analysis when focusing on normative obliga-
tions arising from colonial relations should be that of European civilization. 
This objection draws on the so-called “civilization framework,” which under-
stands colonialism as a European (or European-inspired) project of civiliza-
tion—rather than as a national enterprise—and which leads to emphasizing 
the role played by standards of civilization in justifying and promoting that 
project. As Jean Starobinski observes, civilization is both a descriptive and 
normative concept:56 it takes features (e.g., social, political and organiza-
tional) that some polities display as the normative criteria that political com-
munities should have in order to be “admitted into or barred from the 
international society of states.”57 Civilization, and the standards thereof, are 
therefore used to distinguish the civilized from the barbarians (or uncivi-
lized). Reading European colonialism through the civilization framework 
illustrates how European powers competed and cooperated (e.g., the partition 
of Africa) to forcibly “civilize” what they deemed uncivilized populations. 
Accordingly, our critic would suggest that, compared to the revised concep-
tion of national identity we have employed, the civilization framework pres-
ents some advantages. Like nations (but unlike states), civilizations are 
intergenerational communities and, as such, may generate historical obliga-
tions. Additionally, civilizations are communities of nations, from which it 
follows that the civilization framework would justify a migrants’ right to 
enter to more than one nation. In particular, and to the extent that the EU 
today can be seen as the heir of colonial Europe, postcolonial migrants should 
have a right to immigrate to the EU as a whole, rather than only to their for-
mer European motherland.
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Notwithstanding its alleged advantages, we are skeptical about the success 
of this proposed shift to boost an argument in favour of postcolonial immi-
gration for different reasons. First, even if the language of the civilization 
framework captures the dynamics of many phenomena in contemporary 
world politics, where standards of civilization are invoked to justify the uni-
lateral use of force (e.g., war on terror, humanitarian intervention),58 it seems 
ill-suited to grasp what normatively grounds immigration restrictions. The 
reason for this is that the right to exclude is still based on a nation’s right to 
self-determination and control over its territory, and not on standards of inter-
national conduct.
Second, one may argue that the EU deploys standards of civilization to 
grant membership,59 but it is far-fetched to contend that such criteria are 
exactly the same as those that justified the European colonial project. 
Moreover, even if this argument were pushed, there would still be the prob-
lem that the EU today identifies a larger geographical and political area than 
colonial Europe. Not all of today EU’s member-states were colonial powers. 
In fact, some became themselves the target of these civilization standards 
(e.g., Eastern Europe), which is why it would be perverse to grant postcolo-
nial migrants a right to enter nation-states that, albeit “European,” were once 
under the joke of European standards of civilization.60
A different objection against our proposal is that an immigration policy 
based on historical and cultural considerations cannot be just because of the 
likelihood of its discriminatory effects against cultural minorities already 
present within the nation. Usually immigration policies are criticized when 
they implement negative discrimination, that is, when they exclude would-be 
immigrants on the basis of their undesired cultural characteristics, because 
such policies express a negative judgment about co-nationals sharing the 
same cultural characteristics that are discriminated. To exemplify, if Britain 
were to adopt an immigration policy that restricted the entrance of Muslim 
immigrants, this would arguably have the effect of communicating a negative 
opinion about Muslims who already live within the nation. Our proposal, 
however, does not discriminate negatively. If anything, it is positively dis-
criminatory, in the sense that it advantages migrants from former colonies 
over other types of migrants. This does not make it easier to justify it vis-à-vis 
other cultural groups within the nation. Imagine, for example, that Britain 
established and enforced Indians’ right to enter on the basis of the intertwined 
histories between Britain and India created by colonialism as a special rela-
tion. This may have expressive consequences on, say, British nationals with 
a Japanese culture because it seems to suggest that they contribute less to 
British national identity than co-nationals with Indian origins.61 Such an 
expressive concern would indeed be more worrisome if the immigration 
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status of Indians were granted merely on the basis of a preference for their 
cultural and historical ties. However, we have insisted on conceiving it as the 
fulfilment of an obligation of relational justice in the context of immigration. 
Meeting this obligation does not imply that there is a hierarchy of cultural 
groups within the receiving nation, but only that the former colonizing nation 
recognizes and acts upon a duty of justice.
On Bridging Analytical Political Theory and 
Postcolonial Theory
In this last section, we reflect on the way in which our argumentative strategy 
in this essay speaks to the more general question of how two distinct theoretical 
traditions, such as analytical political theory and postcolonial theory, can be put 
in relation to each other. It is evident from the previous sections that we think 
these two traditions can be constructively integrated. Our present aim is to 
show the theoretical advantages that derive from this integration for thinking 
about normative issues. We illustrate these advantages by explaining what each 
tradition can add to the other when the nation’s right to exclude is considered. 
What we say in this section about our theoretical approach becomes particu-
larly relevant against the current background of mutual indifference—when not 
skepticism—between the two traditions that we juxtapose.62 Therefore, it 
makes sense to begin with the description of such a state of affairs.
On the one hand, we have postcolonial theory which, in spite of its hetero-
geneity, can be described as “reorientating” knowledge towards the perspec-
tives of those who have traditionally occupied a “subaltern” position.63 This 
theoretical standpoint is deeply political in that it points out how subalternity 
resulted from a dispossession of “agency, subjectivity and modes of sociality”64 
by colonial and imperial powers that imposed their particular knowledge-
systems as universal. Given this main feature, it is not surprising that postco-
lonial theorists are suspicious of contemporary analytical political theory—a 
tradition inspired by Enlightenment thinkers and dominated by the liberal 
paradigm65—which they see as too implicated with colonial and imperial 
ideologies.
On the other hand, analytical political theorists tend to disregard postcolo-
nial contributions precisely because of the latter’s expressed political parti-
sanship and alleged lack of analytical rigor. Interestingly, even normative 
explorations of the historical experience of colonialism and of the obligations 
that arise from it, barely mention—when they do not completely fail to 
acknowledge—the existence of an entire theoretical tradition that springs 
from such a historical experience.66
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We find this state of reciprocal neglect and hostility between two impor-
tant literatures regrettable, because it is based on a simplified and often pre-
judged reading that one makes of the other, which forestalls any possibility of 
a productive engagement. Opportunities for exchange become available, 
once we adopt a more sophisticated understanding of these two literatures 
and value the distinctive contributions that they can make. This essay is an 
example of how a mainstream account in analytical political theory can be 
challenged, while at the same time enriched, by insights from postcolonial 
theory.67
In particular, postcolonial theory offers critical tools that show how the 
concepts used by analytical political theory are more complex than they are 
taken to be. As we have shown, this does not necessarily entail the claim, 
usually attributed to many postcolonial theorists,68 that we should abandon 
such concepts; it rather calls for the need to revise them in light of their com-
plex nature. So, for example, one would think that, in normative discussions 
about immigration and the right to exclude, the critical contribution of post-
colonial theory would amount to rejecting the very concept of the nation, 
given its pivotal role in legitimizing violent conquests, exclusions, and sub-
jections over history and specifically during colonialism. However, our argu-
ment shows that the contribution of postcolonial theory lies elsewhere: it 
provides insights for criticizing dominant interpretations of the nation as a 
homogeneous collective, while at the same time allowing a reformulation of 
the concept, which is sensitive to the heterogeneous nature of existing 
national communities. In particular, postcolonial theory is crucial in that it 
offers the notion of intertwined histories to explain how colonialism created 
a history between the colonized and the colonizer by mutually constituting 
their national identities over time. From this critical insight, one can then 
reconstruct a more fluid concept of the nation, on the basis of which the for-
mer colonies (and postcolonial migrants) can be seen as an active and crucial 
component of the national identity of their former colonizer.
Conceptual revisions that result from the application of postcolonial the-
ory to normative issues should be of interest to analytical political theorists 
also because they carry significant implications for the normative position 
one endorses. Specifically, they change our thinking about the obligations of 
justice that should follow from defending that particular normative position. 
To exemplify, consider the case at hand: for a liberal nationalist, postcolonial 
migrants do not represent a category of migrants deserving a particular justi-
fication for exclusion, let alone one that may challenge well-established 
views on a nation’s right to exclude. From a liberal nationalist perspective, 
the decision whether to admit an Algerian migrant to France, for example, 
remains at the discretion of France provided that it satisfied standard liberal 
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criteria (e.g., religious non-discrimination). In other words, the liberal nation-
alist does not recognize the colonial history between these two nations as 
generating any particular obligation of justice in immigration on the part of 
France. Our argumentative strategy instead illustrates how the conceptual 
redefinition of national identity prompted by postcolonial intuitions signifi-
cantly reshapes the liberal nationalist argument on immigration by adding a 
further constraint on the just exercise of a nation’s right to exclude. A concep-
tion of the nation enriched by postcolonial theory compels liberal nationalists 
to regard immigration policies of former colonizing nations, which do not 
recognize the right to enter of migrants from their former colonies, as unjust. 
Therefore, it significantly changes the normative implications that should be 
drawn from within a liberal nationalist perspective.
As a final remark, we want to point out that the engagement of one litera-
ture with the other need not be unilateral. While this essay shows the contri-
bution that postcolonial theory can make to analytical political theory, we 
think that there are benefits postcolonial theorists could gain from greater 
engagement with analytical approaches. The distinctiveness of such 
approaches is their focus on “normative thinking about the sorts of institu-
tions that we ought politically to try and establish.”69 By engaging with ana-
lytical political theorists, postcolonial scholars can complement their 
emphasis on criticizing prevailing social practices and institutional set-ups 
with a more constructive attitude in thinking about how to reform them. In 
the context of immigration, a standard postcolonial argument would provide 
us with reasons to criticize the existing immigration regime, for instance, by 
revealing problematic power relations between those involved. In most 
cases, such an argument would focus on deconstructing immigration prac-
tices, but it would offer little guidance on how to design an alternative pol-
icy, which does not incur into the same problems. A critique of current 
immigration policies is necessary and crucial, but left on its own it begs the 
question as to how a better and more just immigration regime should look 
like. Offering an alternative to what we criticize is equally important, or 
otherwise we risk giving in to the temptation of accepting (though with 
regret) current immigration laws that we see unjust, only because we lack 
better options. In this regard, the kind of constructive normative thinking 
inherent in analytical political theory can be beneficial to the postcolonial 
approach precisely because of its focus on advancing more just immigration 
regimes, which postcolonial theorists can further improve through their sen-
sitivity to the dynamics of power.
We are aware that the kind of exchanges we are invoking here present 
many challenges, but we hope to have shown that putting these two litera-
tures in dialogue may be a worthwhile project.
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Conclusion
Postcolonial migration challenges liberal nationalist accounts of justice in 
immigration by asking whether former colonial nations can legitimately 
exercise a right to exclude would-be immigrants from their former colonies. 
This essay advanced the innovative claim that migrants from ex-colonies 
have a right to enter the borders of their former “motherland.” The claim is 
innovative because it shows that there can be a right to immigrate to a spe-
cific nation-state, despite liberal nationalist beliefs to the contrary. 
Furthermore, our argument is innovative because it enriches the relational 
conception of justice in immigration held by liberal nationalists by bridging 
insights from postcolonial theory with an analytical approach. In particular, 
we showed how colonialism established intertwined histories between the 
nations involved in it, by emphasising the role that its cultural dimension 
played in the development of both the colonized and the colonizers’ national 
identity. Liberal nationalists must acknowledge the consequence of this for 
immigration policy: a nation with a colonial past cannot legitimately refuse 
admission to migrants from its former colonies because they are already part 
of its identity. While this represents an additional constraint to be imposed on 
a nation’s right to exclude, we noted that it does not constrain nations to the 
same extent. The former colonized do not have an obligation to admit those 
coming from their ex-colonizing nation, because colonialism was an unequal 
relation and unequal relations do not give rise to equal obligations.
Acknowledgments
We thank the audiences at these events for intense and stimulating discussions and, in 
particular, Cristóbal Bellolio, Astrid von Busekist, Richard Child, Lior Erez, Bob Goodin, 
Tamar Meissels, Andrei Poama, Miriam Ronzoni and Tom Theuns for their comments. 
We are also grateful to Gabriele Badano, Duncan Bell,,Cécile Laborde, and Laura Lo 
Coco for their written feedback and constructive comments on previous versions of the 
article. Finally, we thank an anonymous referee and the editor of Political Theory whose 
suggestions helped us to make our argument stronger and the essay more interesting.
Author Note
Earlier versions of this essay were presented at the UCL Political Theory PhD Workshop 
in 2014, the 18th Annual Brave New World Graduate Conference in Political Theory, the 
2nd Sciences Po Graduate Conference in Political Theory, and the Workshop on “Justice 
and Immigration” at the 2014 MANCEPT Workshops in Political Theory.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, 
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
 at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on November 23, 2015ptx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Amighetti and Nuti 21
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publi-
cation of this article.
Notes
 1. For more detailed data on the United Kingdom, see Office for National Statistics, 
Immigration Patterns of Non-UK Born Populations in England and Wales in 2011, 
Newport, 2013, http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_346219.pdf (accessed 
April 12, 2014); on France, see Institut National de la Statistique et des Études 
Économiques, Immigrés et Descendants D’immigrés En France, Paris, 2012, 
http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/docs_ffc/ref/IMMFRA12_g_Flot1_pop.pdf. (accessed 
April 12, 2014).
 2. Instituto Nacional de Estatìstica, A População Estrangeira Em Portugal, Lisbon, 
2011, http://www.ine.pt/xportal/xmain?xpid=INE&xpgid=ine_destaques& 
DESTAQUESdest_boui=107625317&DESTAQUESmodo=2. (accessed April 
12, 2014).
 3. Hans van Amersfoort and Mies van Niekerk, “Immigration as a Colonial 
Inheritance: Post-Colonial Immigrants in the Netherlands, 1945–2002,” Journal 
of Ethnic and Migration Studies 32, no. 3 (2006): 335.
 4. Christian Joppke, Selecting by Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 114–44.
 5. Ibid., 28.
 6. Arash Abizadeh, “Democratic Theory and Border Coercion: No Right to 
Unilaterally Control Your Own Borders,” Political Theory 36, no. 1 (2008): 
37–75; and Joseph Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” 
The Review of Politics 49, no. 2 (1987): 251–73; The Ethics of Immigration 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Sarah Fine, Immigration and the Right 
to Exclude (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
 7. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 48–51. For 
an exception, see Christopher Heath Wellman, “Immigration and Freedom of 
Association,” Ethics 119, no. 1 (2008): 128.
 8. David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), 223.
 9. Colonialism in this essay refers to the European-inspired project of subjugating 
other nations to alien control, which took place from the sixteenth to the twentieth 
centuries. For length-constraints we cannot account for the nature of so-called 
neocolonialism and neo-imperialism. For a recent contribution on this within 
analytical political theory see Richard Miller, Globalizing Justice: The Ethics of 
Poverty and Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), chaps. 5–7.
10. Sometimes civic nationalism or constitutional patriotism, i.e., the mere loyalty 
to political (liberal) institutions, is considered a strand of liberal nationalism. In 
this essay, liberal nationalism is understood as a theory that attempts to merge 
the significance of national identity with liberal values. For a taxonomy, see 
 at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on November 23, 2015ptx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
22 Political Theory 
Chaim Gans, The Limits of Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 29.
11. David Miller, “Justice in Immigration,” European Journal of Political Theory, 
forthcoming.
12. Ibid.
13. David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 73; 
Margaret Moore, The Ethics of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 36; and Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1993), 96.
14. Margaret Moore, “Defending Community: Nationalism, Patriotism, and Culture,” 
in Ethics and World Politics, ed. Duncan Bell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 136.
15. Miller, On Nationality, 43.
16. Ernest Renan quoted in Gans, The Limits of Nationalism, 11.
17. Ethnicity, on the contrary, is not regarded by liberal nationalists as a necessary 
component of national identity. See Ibid., 15; Miller, On Nationality, 20; and 
Moore, The Ethics of Nationalism, 6.
18. Moore, The Ethics of Nationalism, 12, 17; and Gans, The Limits of Nationalism, 
49.
19. Miller, On Nationality, 23.
20. Gans, The Limits of Nationalism, 28–29; and Miller, On Nationality, 23.
21. Farid Abdel-Nour, “National Responsibility,” Political Theory 31, no. 5 (2003): 
693–719; and Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 6.
22. Gans, The Limits of Nationalism, 130; David Miller, “Immigration: The Case 
for Limits,” in Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics, ed. Andrew Cohen 
and Christopher Wellman (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 202; and National 
Responsibility and Global Justice, 218–19.
23. Daniel Butt, Rectifying International Injustice: Principles of Compensation 
and Restitution Between Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); 
Catherine Lu, “Colonialism as Structural Injustice: Historical Responsibility 
and Contemporary Redress,” Journal of Political Philosophy 19, no. 3 (2011): 
261–81; Kok-Chor Tan, “Colonialism, Reparations and Global Justice,” in 
Reparations: Interdisciplinary Inquiries, ed. Jon Miller and Rahul Kumar 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 280–306; and Lea Ypi, “What’s Wrong 
with Colonialism,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 41, no. 2 (2013): 158–91.
24. Rajeev Bhargava, “How Should We Respond to the Cultural Injustice of 
Colonialism?,” in Reparations: Interdisciplinary Inquiries, ed. Jon Miller and 
Rahul Kumar (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 216; and Albert Memmi, 
The Colonizer and the Colonized (Boston: Beacon Press, 1991), 6.
25. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Outside in the Teaching Machine (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 61.
26. Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, trans. Charles L. Markmann (London: 
Pluto Press, 1967), 40.
27. Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, 148.
 at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on November 23, 2015ptx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Amighetti and Nuti 23
28. Aimé Césaire, Discourse on Colonialism, trans. Joan Pinkham (New York: 
Monthly Review Press, 2000), 42.
29. Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 2004).
30. Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative 
Discourse? (London: Zed Books, 1986).
31. Ashis Nandy, The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983), 4–11.
32. Nicholas Dirks, Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).
33. Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized, 100.
34. Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 8.
35. Moore, The Ethics of Nationalism, 57.
36. Timothy Brennan, “The National Longing for Form,” in Nation and Narration, 
ed. Homi K. Bhabha (New York: Routledge, 1990), 49–50; see also Benedict 
Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, 2nd ed. (London: Verso Books, 1991), 25.
37. Said, Culture and Imperialism, xiii.
38. Ibid., 20–35; 159–95.
39. Edward Said, “Always on Top,” London Review of Books, March 20, 2003.
40. Said, Culture and Imperialism, 15.
41. Thomas Hurka, “The Justification of National Partiality,” in The Morality of 
Nationalism, ed. Robert McKim and Jeff McMahan (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), 150–52.
42. See Lea Ypi, Robert Goodin, and Christian Barry, “Associative Duties, Global 
Justice, and the Colonies,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 37, no. 2 (2009): 121–22.
43. Said, Culture and Imperialism, 36.
44. Bhabha, The Location of Culture, 212. There may be two concerns here about the 
possible tension that the concept of intertwined histories could have with respect 
to the two theoretical perspectives we consider, i.e., (1) postcolonial theory and 
(2) liberal nationalism. Regarding (1), the tension is about the very possibility 
of developing an account of the nation by taking in genuine postcolonial con-
cerns. In response, we note that postcolonialists treat nationalist ideas (both in 
theory and practice) often ambivalently: they tend to be internationalists, while 
at the same time acknowledging the necessity of the nation; see Rahul Rao, Third 
World Protest: Between Home and the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), chap. 4. Moreover, our aim is to revise the idea of the “nation” in liberal 
nationalism by drawing on insights from postcolonial theory, and not to dis-
cuss whether our proposed notion is fully compatible with postcolonialism. With 
respect to (2), the tension arises because the notion of intertwined histories could 
replace the very concept of the nation, so why retain the latter? While we recog-
nize that this may well be a possible implication of our argument, we can only 
sketch (due to length constraints) two different strategies for avoiding it. Our 
first reason is pragmatic and concerns the possibility of altogether rejecting the 
idea of the nation given its enduring relevance in world politics (see below). The 
 at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on November 23, 2015ptx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
24 Political Theory 
second reason is methodological, and refers to the particular way in which this 
essay tries to accommodate postcolonialism within analytical political theory. 
As explained in the last section, we draw on the critical potential of postcolo-
nial theory to substantially revise concepts that are central to analytical political 
thinking, rather than abandoning them.
45. Bhargava, “Reparations”; Butt, Rectifying International Injustice; Lu, 
“Colonialism as Structural Injustice”; and Tan, “Colonialism, Reparations and 
Global Justice.”
46. On this point, see Sara Amighetti and Alasia Nuti, “David Miller’s Theory of 
Redress and the Complexity of Colonial Injustice,” Ethics & Global Politics, 
forthcoming.
47. Ypi, Goodin, and Barry, “Associative Duties, Global Justice, and the Colonies,” 124.
48. One could ask whether our notion of intertwined histories provides a distinc-
tive justification for the postcolonial right to enter with respect to the principle 
of “constituted identities” advanced by Rogers Smith. For him, constitutional 
democracies should “include as equal citizens all persons with identities that 
have in significant measure been constituted by the democracies’ coercively 
enforced governmental measures” (“The Principle of Constituted Identities and 
the Obligation to Include,” Ethics & Global Politics 1, no. 3 [2008]: 140). Since 
they challenge immigration restrictions on the basis of processes of identity 
formation, the two arguments clearly overlap. However, their similar inclusiv-
ist policy implications are grounded on considerations that significantly differ. 
While Smith’s principle focuses on “forced coercion” as the source of the right 
to include, our notion of intertwined histories justifies that right on the basis of 
the active role that the colonies played in substantially shaping the identity of the 
colonizers. Far from downplaying the role of coercion in describing the colo-
nial relation, our argument stresses the fact that the colonizers and the colonized 
mutually shaped their identities, despite coercion. This has the advantage of rec-
ognizing the colonized as active contributors to the development of the identity 
of their colonizers, and not just as their “passive victims.” This is a crucial point 
as it avoids reproducing the very colonial categories, which constructed colonial 
powers as the only active contributors to their national history and their colo-
nies as passive subjects. See W. E. B. Du Bois’s argument about the importance 
of recognizing the “gifts” of African Americans to the formation of the United 
States (The Gift of Black Folk [Boston: Stratford, 1924]). In sum, Smith’s prin-
ciple gets us to the right conclusions, but for the wrong reasons. Additionally, 
once we consider cases other than colonialism, the two arguments may not even 
converge in their implications. For example, Smith would grant the inclusion of 
Filipinos in the United States given that their identity has been coercively shaped 
by the latter. For us, this is a less straightforward conclusion which could only be 
justified once it is shown that Filipinos played a constitutive role in the forma-
tion of U.S. national identity. Conversely, while we would support a free border 
policy between Britain and France (even if either of them left the EU) in light 
of their intertwined histories, the lack of coercion in the shaping of each other’s 
 at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on November 23, 2015ptx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Amighetti and Nuti 25
identity would lead Smith to cast this possibility aside. We thank an anonymous 
referee for pressing us on this comparison.
49. Joppke, Selecting by Origin, 104–11.
50. Ibid., 144–49.
51. We thank Tom Theuns for helping us formulate this point.
52. Said, “Always on Top.”
53. For a detailed analysis of this policy and similar ones, see Joppke, Selecting by 
Origin, 111–44.
54. See, e.g., Sune Lægaard, “David Miller on Immigration Policy and Nationality,” 
Journal of Applied Philosophy 24, no. 3 (2007): 289–94; and Jacob Levy, 
“National and Statist Responsibility,” Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy 11, no. 4 (2008): 485–99.
55. Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 112–13.
56. Jean Starobinski, Blessings in Disguise; Or, The Morality of Evil, trans. Arthur 
Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 1–35.
57. Brett Bowden, The Empire of Civilization: The Evolution of an Imperial Idea 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 103–4.
58. Ibid., chap. 8. See also Marvin L. Astrada, American Power After 9/11 (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 23–38.
59. We refer in particular to the political accession criteria for membership to the EU 
(“Copenhagen Criteria”), which include the rule of law, respect for human rights, 
the protection of minorities, and stable democratic institutions.
60. Although our discussion rejects the existence of a postcolonial right to enter into 
the EU, it does not exclude that immigrants entering one of the EU member-
states on the basis of our postcolonial right may enjoy free movement within the 
EU. In our case, the enjoyment of free movement is not directly accorded by the 
right to immigrate, but it depends on other factors, e.g., the speed of citizenship 
acquisition or the availability of being granted a Schengen visa upon entrance in 
that member-state. We thank an anonymous referee for inviting us to discuss the 
civilization framework.
61. This line of argument is similar to Joseph Carens, “Who Should Get In? The 
Ethics of Immigration Admissions,” Ethics & International Affairs 17, no. 1 
(2003): 110.
62. There are some notable exceptions; see e.g., Duncan Ivison, Postcolonial 
Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); and Margaret 
Kohn, “Postcolonialism and Global Justice,” Journal of Global Ethics 9, no. 2 
(2013): 187–200.
63. Robert Young, Postcolonialism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 6.
64. Duncan Ivison, “Postcolonialism and Political Theory,” in Political Theory: 
Tradition and Diversity, ed. Andrew Vincent (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 156.
65. We borrow this broad understanding of analytical political theory from Philip 
Pettit, “Analytical Philosophy,” in A Companion to Contemporary Political 
 at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on November 23, 2015ptx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
26 Political Theory 
Philosophy, ed. Robert E. Goodin, Philip Pettit, and Thomas Pogge, 2nd ed., 
vol. 1 (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 5. Note that the reference to the dominance of 
the liberal paradigm should also be understood broadly as to include positions, 
like realism and neo-republicanism, that tend to distinguish themselves from the 
liberal paradigm more narrowly conceived.
66. E.g., Lu, “Colonialism as Structural Injustice”; Ypi, “What’s Wrong with 
Colonialism”; Ypi, Goodin, and Barry, “Associative Duties, Global Justice, and 
the Colonies.”
67. To the extent that we do so, we side with recent contributions that attempt to 
overcome the state of indifference between these literatures. See note 62.
68. To be sure, postcolonial theorists relate with ambivalence to the concept of the 
nation, as we have discussed in note 44.
69. Pettit, “Analytical Philosophy,” 7.
Author Biographies
Sara Amighetti is a PhD Candidate at University College London (Department of 
Political Science) and she is writing her thesis on the scope of a theory of social justice 
based on relational equality. She is interested in global justice, democratic theory, 
immigration, and the philosophy of public policy.
Alasia Nuti is a PhD Candidate at the University of Cambridge (Pembroke College) 
who is working on historical injustice and structural injustice. Her other research 
interests include global justice, feminist theory, postcolonial theory, multiculturalism, 
democratic theory, and immigration.
 at CAMBRIDGE UNIV LIBRARY on November 23, 2015ptx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
